Attackers exploited CVE-2026-90436, a CVSS 9.8 flaw in the Apache Axis 1.x SOAP library, against an Atlassian Confluence Data Center server on November 13, 2026, and were logged in to its MySQL database just over three minutes after their first command ran. Any Confluence Data Center from 1.x through 9.x with the Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) switched on is exposed, as is N-able N-central with its Legacy API enabled. Rapid7, which caught the intrusion, says to fix it now.
Key takeaways
- CVE-2026-90436 is an unauthenticated RCE (CVSS 9.8) in end-of-life Apache Axis 1.x, and Apache will not ship a fixed 1.x release.
- Confluence Data Center 1.x through 9.x is exploitable only with Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) enabled; 9.2.28 fixes it, and 10.x and Atlassian Cloud are unaffected.
- In Rapid7's case, HTTP 500 responses hid working exploitation: MySQL access came just over 3 minutes after the first command, Microsoft 365 access about 12 hours in.
- N-central customers should confirm their MSP runs 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39), which disables the Legacy API.
What is CVE-2026-90436?
CVE-2026-90436 is an unauthenticated remote code execution bug in Apache Axis 1.x, an old SOAP engine for Java web services. The Apache Software Foundation disclosed it on November 6, 2026, and classed it as unsafe reflection (CWE-470). The reporting attributes the 9.8 CVSS score to CISA.
Unsafe reflection means outside input decides which Java class or method gets loaded and called. On a network-facing SOAP endpoint, a crafted request reaches code the developers never meant to expose, running with the Java service’s rights. No login required.
The catch: Apache will not fix it. Axis 1.x through 1.4 is end of life, and no fixed 1.x release is coming. Apache’s advice is to move to another SOAP engine such as Apache Axis 2, or build Axis 1.x yourself with the patch it has published. The jar still sits inside products that bundled it years ago, so every vendor shipping it has to ship its own fix.
Is your Confluence or N-central actually exposed?
Only if a non-default API is turned on. Two products are confirmed to ship the vulnerable library:
- Confluence Data Center 1.x through 9.x is exploitable when Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) is enabled. New installs have shipped with it off since Confluence 3.0.
- Confluence 10.x and later removed the feature and is not vulnerable.
- Atlassian Cloud is unaffected.
- N-able N-central is exploitable only with Legacy API enabled, which is also off by default.
Shipped off does not mean still off. An instance upgraded in place for a decade, or one where somebody enabled the API for a reporting script, can still have it on. In audits we often find integration settings flipped on “temporarily” years ago.
For a WordPress or Joomla owner, the website itself is not the target. The risk sits next to it: the wiki holding hosting logins, SSH keys and deploy notes, or the MSP console that can push commands to every machine you own.
What did Rapid7 see on November 13?
Rapid7’s managed detection team watched a full intrusion unfold from one exposed SOAP endpoint. It started with unauthenticated POST requests to the Axis servlet under /plugins/servlet/soap-axis1/ on a customer’s Confluence Data Center. Every request returned HTTP 500.
That looks like failure. It wasn’t. In Rapid7’s words: “Despite the error responses, endpoint telemetry showed Confluence’s Java process launching Bash and curl as the dedicated confluence service account, within seconds of these requests.” A 500 only means the server choked while building a reply.
- Seconds in: hundreds of hex-encoded shell commands and scripts, pulled from short-lived Pinggy and Cloudflare Tunnel domains. Output came wrapped in labeled delimiters with sequential task IDs, which Rapid7 reads as AI-assisted automation.
- Just over 3 minutes after the first execution: a MySQL login with Confluence’s own database credentials, which code running as the service account can read directly. The attacker queried page bodies, application links and attachments named after credentials, tokens, VPN configs and private keys.
- The next hours: “likely AI-generated” scripts combed the attachment store, parsed Office files and hunted for passwords and payment card numbers, using Luhn checks to weed out false hits.
- Directory probing: a Confluence application credential queried the internal Atlassian Crowd API for users and groups. An AS-REP roasting attempt with Impacket’s GetNPUsers.py against a domain controller failed.
- About 4 hours: a service account credential taken from Confluence opened a production cloud data warehouse.
- About 12 hours: a Microsoft 365 sign-in as an integration service account over legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, from an IP that also appeared in the Pinggy hostname and the exploit requests.
N-able separately reported in-the-wild exploitation of N-central the same day, one day after a public proof of concept aimed at N-central appeared on November 12. Rapid7 says that activity “strongly correlates” with CVE-2026-90436, though N-able has not been quoted confirming the CVE number.
How do you fix CVE-2026-90436 in Confluence?
Upgrade to Confluence 9.2.28, or move to 10.x where the feature no longer exists. If you can’t patch today, switch the API off:
- Log in as a Confluence administrator and open General Configuration.
- Go to Further Configuration and click edit.
- Clear Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) and save.
No restart is needed. Anything talking to Confluence over XML-RPC or SOAP will stop working, so expect complaints from old reporting scripts and connectors. That costs far less than a twelve-hour intrusion chain.
Rapid7 says to remediate exposed systems “on an emergency basis outside of normal patching cycles.” Start with internet-facing instances that have the API on, then internal ones, which an attacker on a laptop or VPN account can reach too. Compare this with how admins handled Atlassian’s CVE-2026-21589.
What if you can't install the official patch?
Then the Remote API switch above is your patch, and it works on every affected version. Plenty of Confluence servers will never see 9.2.28: maintenance lapsed, the version is out of support, or the vendor relationship ended, as when Atlassian suspended sales in Russia in 2022. Those frozen wikis tend to hold exactly what the Rapid7 attacker hunted for: network diagrams, VPN profiles and service account passwords.
If an integration truly needs the API, add compensating controls (our recommendations, not Atlassian guidance):
- Restrict the path. Block soap-axis1 at the reverse proxy or web firewall for everything except known integration hosts, and keep Confluence behind a VPN.
- Watch the process tree. Alert when the Confluence Java process spawns a shell, curl or any interpreter. That catches this bug and the next one.
- Avoid hand-swapping the Axis jar. It is unsupported and can break the app; treat it as a tested last resort.
None of this fixes the real problem: a wiki that can’t be patched will meet another flaw like this. Budget for a supported version or a migration.
What should N-central customers ask their MSP?
Ask whether they run N-central 2026.4 HF3 (2026.4.1.39), released November 16, 2026. It disables the Legacy API and addresses multiple issues, including seventeen new CVEs, so the build number matters more than the toggle. Rapid7 says to upgrade on an emergency basis.
Before HF3, N-able told on-premises admins to confirm Legacy API was off even on 2026.4 HF2, and pushed temporary protections to hosted tenants. Both groups still have to follow the Agent and Probe upgrade guidance. N-able also temporarily disabled the Intune integration as a precaution.
Questions for your MSP:
- Which N-central build are you running, and when did you install HF3?
- Was Legacy API ever enabled on your server?
- Have Agents and Probes on our machines been upgraded?
- Did you check logs against N-able’s published IPs and URLs, and what else did you check?
Rapid7 warns that “the absence of these addresses does not confirm that an environment was unaffected.” Tunnel domains are disposable.
What if the wiki or the RMM was already hit?
If code ran, assume every secret the service could read is gone: the confluence account, the database password, the attachment store, application link and Crowd credentials, and any password written into a page.
Isolate the host and preserve web, application, endpoint and sign-in logs before retention rotates them away. Build a timeline from the first POST to soap-axis1 through database, directory, cloud and Microsoft 365 activity. Rotate secrets based on the evidence, and block legacy authentication for service accounts in Microsoft 365.
Hosting and CMS credentials pulled from a breached wiki usually resurface in a later website compromise. Rotate hosting panel, SFTP and CMS admin passwords, then run a server-side website malware scan to catch webshells and injected code that a password change leaves behind.
What is still unknown?
The reporting does not say how many servers have the vulnerable APIs enabled, or whether other products quietly bundle Axis 1.x. Nobody has named the attackers. Rapid7’s indicators cover one intrusion, so treat them as leads. Its advisory came out November 16 and was updated November 17; expect more revisions.
FAQ
Is my Confluence Data Center exposed to CVE-2026-90436 if the Remote API was never turned on?
No. The bug is reachable only when Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) is enabled. Check General Configuration > Further Configuration, since older upgraded instances may have it on.
Which Confluence version fixes CVE-2026-90436?
Confluence 9.2.28. Version 10.x removed the feature, and Atlassian Cloud is not affected.
Can I protect an unsupported Confluence without a patch?
Yes. Clearing the Remote API (XML-RPC & SOAP) option closes the entry point on any affected version without a restart, and only breaks integrations that use it.
What does an HTTP 500 on soap-axis1 mean?
Not that the attack failed. In the Rapid7 case every request returned 500 while Confluence's Java process launched Bash and curl, so check endpoint telemetry for child processes.
If your wiki, RMM or hosting stack holds the keys to your websites, get them checked from the outside. We run a security audit of your sites and the servers behind them and help clean up if something was already taken.
